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SUMMARY 
Motivated by growing attention to the creation of a manufacturer-owned direct resell 
channel, the main purpose of this thesis is to study how channel members react to 
simultaneous horizontal and vertical competition, and if the resulting conflict might 
overwhelm any potential advantages. Based on a general dual-channel distribution 
model, where a monopolist manufacturer sells its product through both a traditional 
retail channel and a direct sell channel, we study the inter-channel competition in two 
scenarios. First we consider the competition pricing strategy of each channel member 
under both centralized and decentralized decision making. Our results show that 
launching a new direct channel raises manufacturer’s profit dramatically. Moreover, 
contrasting to existing studies, retailer’s profit decreases even when consumers prefer 
traditional retailer to direct channel. This suggests that the technique of demand 
modeling plays an important role in the pricing decision process. In the second 
scenario, we study the jointly optimal price and inventory decision as a newsvendor 
problem, considering dynamic customer choice when channel stock out occurs. As the 
decisions critically depends on the stochastic demand process, we numerically 
investigate the effect of inter-channel excess demand shifting on the optimal decisions 
based on linear demand function and multinomial logit model (MNL).  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
In the past few decades, we have witnessed a number of significant developments in 
information technology and major changes in business environment, such as E-
commerce, globalization, and intense international cooperation. These forces bring a 
traditional business concern, distribution channel choice, back to the attention of 
companies and academic researchers. The expanding role of Internet in consumer and 
business procurement and the economics of material delivery give birth to direct 
marketing, where the manufacturer controls the sales and marketing activities. In this 
business setting, the manufacturer could provide services and information to end 
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customers directly through Internet, reducing operation cost and advertisement cost 
dramatically. Firms could control dealers and contact small customers in a very cost 
effective manner, reducing the reliance on dealers. The advantages include extended 
market coverage, increased sales volume, lower costs, as well as better accommodation 
of customers’ needs and communication.  
However, this does not mean that manufacturers could totally abandon 
intermediate retailers. Indeed, good relationship with retailers leads to high efficiency 
in making product widely available and large market share in non-brand loyal 
consumers. Thus, dual-channel supply chains, combining independent retailer channel 
with direct selling channel, have been widely adopted. For example, Sony has 
traditional physical retail shops accompanied by an online direct channel. Demand 
from customers at the retail store is met with the store’s on-hand inventory while 
orders placed through the direct channel are satisfied from the direct channel’s 
warehouse. It is reported in a survey in The New York Times (Tedeschi, 2000) that 
about 42% of top suppliers (e.g. IBM, Pioneer Electronics, Cisco system, Estee Lauder, 
and Nike) in a variety of industries have begun to sell directly to consumers over the 
internet, besides their traditional distribution channels.  
Although an increasing number of firms now launch direct distribution channel to 
complement their traditional distribution retail stores, in order to survive and gain 
advance position in the fierce competing business environment, this vision faces 
various implementation challenges. Normally, to design a multi-channel distribution 
system, we must consider whether it is profitable to adopt multiple distribution 
channels, which channels should be opened, how to coordinate these channels to foster 
channel confluence and synergy rather than conflict, whether it is possible to reduce 
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the overall distribution cost by a well-designed multiple channels structure. Actually, 
distribution channel strategy is a real long-term strategy due to the enormous channel 
build-up cost and significant impact on the company. It is always said that what you 
had in the past, the baggage you carry (Coelho and Easingwood 2004). Thus, a 
systematic approach for channel decision process is extremely necessary. Rosenbloom 
(2007) points out that the quality of the channel mix has the most important impact on 
a firm’s customer base. A well-designed distribution channel strategy will be the key 
to a successful marketing strategy in the future (Fein and Jap, 1999).  
1.2 Motivation and Research Scope 
An obvious and almost inevitable obstacle in a market covered by both intermediated 
and manufacturer-owned channels is the inter-channel conflict. Specifically, 
manufacturer could become a competitor to its intermediaries after launching a direct 
channel. In recent years, this conflict has been quite visible and frequently cited as the 
most significant barriers to multi-channel strategy, such as in IBM (Nasiretti, 1998), 
Estee Lauder (Machlis 1998(a)), Avon (Machlis, 1998(b)), etc. The hostility between 
the manufacturer and its intermediaries can even force manufacturers to abandon a 
channel entirely. Levi’s is an early and famous example of manufacturers which give 
up the on-line direct channel because of strong protests from key retailers (Davis, 
2001).   
The primary interests of this thesis are in how channel members react to 
simultaneously vertical and horizontal competition in terms of their price and 
inventory decisions, and to what degree this inter-channel conflict would destroy the 
channel efficiency.  
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We conduct our study based on a simplified dual-channel system, where a 
monopolist manufacturer sells its product through both the traditional retail channel 
and its own direct resale channel (Figure 1.1). Consumers can choose to purchase from 
either of these two channels, or refer to an outside option where the manufacturer loses 
this demand. Channel demands are then derived based on consumers’ purchase 
decisions — purchase from which channel. Consumers make their decisions depending 
on their consumption values and the channel selling prices. Consumption value is the 
amount of money that the consumer would like to spend on the product or service. 
Since channels provide various purchase service outputs besides the common product, 
consumers would have different consumption values for channels according to their 








Figure 1.1 General Model Structure 
 
This thesis comprises two scenarios. First we consider the competition pricing 
strategy in this dual-channel distribution model. Consumer’s consumption values are 
viewed as two independent random variables. As customer’s purchasing decision 
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would be affected by the channel resale prices, manufacturer and retailer attempt to 
maximize their profits through optimal pricing decision. Both of the optimal pricing 
strategies under centralized decision making and decentralized decision making are 
studied. In the case of centralized decision making, retail price and direct sell price are 
determined in coordination to maximize the total profits of both the two channels. In 
the case of decentralized decision making, manufacturer decides the wholesale price 
(to retailer) and direct sell price to optimize its profit first; and then retailer decides the 
resale price to optimize its profit. Compared to single channel distribution system, due 
to stepping forward to engage in competition for end customer with retailer, 
manufacturer would make much more profit in dual-channel system, while 
significantly damaging the retailer, except the cases in which customer’s consumption 
value on direct channel is far less than that on retail channel. 
Then, we pay more attention to the effect of inventory on manufacturer and 
retailer’s profits. We study the single period jointly optimal price and inventory 
decision in dual-channel distribution system. Different from joint price and inventory 
problem in single channel distribution system, special attention has been put on the 
effect of inter-channel stock-out demand shifting on manufacturer’s pricing and 
capacity decision. Due to the substitutability between these two channels, customer 
might shift to the other channel when their first choice channel is out of stock, which 
would induce manufacturer to over stock. We investigate how customer’s shifting 
behavior would affect the optimal inventory and price decisions as well as the profits.   
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1.3 Summary of Contributions 
In this thesis, we mainly focus on the inter-channel competition and coordination in a 
simplified dual-channel distribution prototype where a monopolist manufacturer sells 
its product through both the traditional retail channel and its own direct channel.  
In Chapter 3, we study the competing pricing strategy in this dual-channel 
distribution system. Both of the optimal pricing strategies under centralized decision 
making and decentralized decision making are studied. In the case of decentralized 
decision making, Stackelberg game model is used to describe manufacturer and 
retailer’s behaviors. Since the demand functions we consider are quadratic functions of 
pr and pd, the profit functions become cubic functions, leading to significant increases 
in computational complexity. Our numerical study shows that manufacturer’s profit 
rises dramatically after launching a new direct channel. On the other hand, contrary to 
many existing studies, retailer’s profit decreases even when consumers prefer 
traditional retail channel to direct sale channel. This result suggests that the technique 
for consumer consumption value modeling plays an important role in the pricing 
decision process.     
In Chapter 4, we study the jointly optimal price and inventory decision as a 
newsvendor problem based on this general dual-channel supply chain model. Special 
attention has been put on the effect of this inter-channel stock-out demand shifting on 
manufacturer’s pricing and capacity decision. We build up the distribution of the 
effective direct channel demand conditioning on retailer’s order quantity and resell 
price. Although retailer’s problem is a standard newsvendor problem, manufacturer’s 
decision is a combined two-stage price-setting newsvendor problem that no closed 
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form solution could be obtained. To gain management insights, we numerically study 
this problem based on two demand processes, one being the linear demand function, 
the other being the multinomial logit model (MNL). It is observed that the effect of 
inter-channel stock-out demand shifting on manufacturer’s capacity is quite sensitive 
to the retailer’s demand variance and the ration that excess demand shift, while that 
effect on optimal price is not so dramatic.  
1.4 Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows. Literature surveys on related work are presented in 
Chapter 2, including marketing literature on multi-channel distribution strategy and the 
operations management literature on pricing and inventory control.  
The pricing competition between the traditional retail channel and direct channel is 
investigated in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 studies the joint price and inventory decisions 
considering the dynamic customer choice when channel stock out occurs.  
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes all studies in this thesis and gives several directions 
for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter 2 reviews the previous works related to pricing and inventory strategies in two 
areas, the marketing literature on multi-channel distribution strategy and the operations 
management literature on pricing and inventory control.  
2.1 Multi-channel Distribution Strategy  
Multi-channel marketing enables firms to build lasting customer relationships by 
simultaneously offering their customers prospects information, products, services and 
supports through synchronized channels. It is noted that multi-channel strategy is 
becoming increasingly crucial for companies (Easingwood and Storey 1996, and 
Frazier 1999), but the literature has not matched the practical importance (Bradach and 
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Eccles 1989, and Coelho and Easingwood 2004). Coelho and Easingwood (2004) 
presented a comprehensive review of multi-channel systems in services industry.  
As our specific interest is in analytic model-based research on strategic behavior of 
companies when they reach customers through both internal and external distribution 
channels (e.g., internet, sales force, and value-added resellers), we focus on 
quantitative managerial models of dual-channel distribution system comprising one 
direct channel and one indirect channel with intermediary retailers. In this case, 
manufacturer is not only a channel partner of the retailer, but also a competitor with 
the retailer over the same market; and therefore conflicts between manufacturer and 
retailer are incurred. Hence, there are two kinds of competition should be considered: 
horizontal competition over end-customers and vertical competition between two 
supply chain entities.  
There are two streams of models studying pricing strategies in a hybrid market 
with respect to methods of demand modeling. One stream investigates the optimal 
channel strategy and equilibrium prices by assuming a general demand function, 
usually a linear function with respect to both channel prices. Bell et al. (2002) 
proposed a linear demand function depending on selling prices at all retailers in the 
market and their market service level. The authors argue that through forward 
integration and investment in brand-specific marketing effort, the manufacturer can 
achieve a form of resale price maintenance.  
Tsay and Agrawal (2004) considered the positive impact of direct selling sales 
effort on demand expansion. They suggested that the addition of a direct channel 
alongside a reseller channel can benefit both manufacturer and retailer if proper 
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managerial strategies are applied. Corporation strategies are also proposed to address 
the problem of “channel conflict” and adjust manufacturer-reseller relationship.  
In Kumar and Ruan (2006), retailer sells two products with different service levels. 
Manufacturer can buy high service from retailer with lower wholesale price, adding a 
direct channel to balance the loss in low wholesale price.  
The other stream, focusing on how customer’s channel preference impacts the 
optimal pricing strategy, uses a demand function induced from a customer channel 
choice model. This stream of models avoids the difficulty of parameter estimation of 
general demand functions. Balasubramanian (1998) modeled competition in the 
multiple-channel environment from a strategic perspective. A circular spatial market 
model is adopted to capture the relative attractiveness of retail shopping and direct 
marketer varying across consumers. It is suggested that the level of information 
disseminated and direct market coverage can be used as tools for competition control.  
Hendershott and Zhang (2001) took consumer’s search cost into consideration. 
They argued that channel conflict is inevitable in dual-channel systems, although the 
analysis suggested that enough benefit could be generated to fund side payments that 
would appease the intermediaries.  
Chiang et al. (2003) studied a price-competition game between manufacturer and 
retailer. They assumed a multiplicative relationship between consumer’s reservation 
prices of retail channel and direct channel with fixed multiplier and random retail 
channel reservation price. The results show that direct marketing makes the 
manufacturer more profitable by posing a viable threat to draw customers away from 
the retailer and alleviate the degree of double marginalization.  
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Cattani et al. (2006) presented an equal price strategy based on a linear customer 
utility model where each customer has an independent preference for direct and 
traditional channels.  
Our research in Chapter 3 follows the second stream, deriving demands from 
customers’ choice. The demand functions of the inter-channel pricing competition 
model we studied are quadratic functions, which greatly increase the complicacy of 
this problem. We allow unequal channel prices, which is more realistic and generate 
higher profits than Cattani et al (2006).  In Chapter 4, we study the joint price and 
inventory problem for general linear demand function and Multinomial Logit customer 
choice model.  
2.2 Pricing and Inventory in Single Channel System 
2.2.1 Multiple product inventory models with dynamic customer choice 
Dynamic customer choice means that customer would shift to other products when 
his/her favorite product is out of stock. When this effect is taken into consideration, the 
optimal inventory policy of each product would depend on the inventory positions and 
demands of other products.  
McGillivray and Silver (1978) started this stream of research. Parlar (1988) studied 
initial inventory level decisions of two firms carrying similar products facing random 
demands under competition with simultaneous and sequential moves. In this model, a 
deterministic fraction of excess demand for each good substitutes to the alternative if 
the alternative good has excess stock.  
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Lippman and McCardle (1997) studied an inventory competition game under 
different rules of initial allocation demands and reallocation of excess demands at any 
firms. Anupindi and Bassok (1999) investigated the effects of stock-out demand 
shifting on inventory pooling strategy in a two echelon supply chain with one supplier 
and two retailers. In this paper, they named the stock-out demand shifting as “market 
search”. Dai et al. (2005) analyzed manufacturer’s inventory allocation rule facing the 
capacity competition of two retailers.  This model focuses on the equilibrium of 
retailer’s capacity game, whereas Anupindi and Bassok (1999) ignored this game. Dai 
et al. (2006) extended this model to consider the capacity allocation game between two 
manufacturers both of which have traditional and Internet channels.  
Netessine and Rudi (2003) studied the optimal inventory policy with n 
substitutable products under both centralized and competitive situation. In this paper, 
the stock-out demand substitution is named “customer-direct” substitutions. Mahajan 
and van Ryzin (2001a, 2001b) studied the initial inventory decision assuming that the 
demand process is a stochastic sequence of heterogeneous customers who choose 
product dynamically from the available products based on a utility maximization 
criterion. They proposed a sample path gradient algorithm to find the stationary points 
of expected profit function.  
2.2.2 Joint Pricing and Inventory Decision Model 
The studies on newsvendor problem considering endogenous price were started in 
1950 with the work of Whiting (1955) and Mills (1959). They investigated the optimal 
pricing and inventory decisions for one retailer selling one product under stochastic 
demand. Petruzzin and Dada (1999) provided a comprehensive review of this problem. 
Chen and Simchi-Levi (2002) analyzed a finite horizon, single product, periodic 
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review model in which pricing and production/inventory decisions are made 
simultaneously. This model is extended to incorporate risk aversion by Chen et al 
(2007).  
Birge et al. (1998) was the first one integrating pricing and capacity decision in a 
single period problem with two substitutable products.  Chen et al. (2004) considered a 
multiple newsvendors pricing game. Bernstein and Federgruen (2003, 2004, and 2005) 
addressed coordination of manufacturer and a set of competing retailers facing 
stochastic demands. All the above models, however, only consider the price-based 
substitution and ignore stock-out-based substitution. Zhao and Atkins (2008) worked 
on multi newsvendor simultaneous price and inventory completion considering stock-
out demand shifting. They showed the existence and uniqueness of the Nash 
equilibrium.  
2.3 Pricing and Inventory in Dual-Channel System 
From a supply-chain viewpoint, a great attractiveness of integration of a direct and an 
indirect channel, besides significant profit gains, is dramatically inventory reduction.  
Chiang and Monahan (2005) presented a one-to-one inventory control policy in a 
two-echelon dual-channel supply chain where manufacturer and retailer are 
competitors and keeping stock independently, considering the inventory positions at 
these two entities as a Markov stochastic process. They indicated that the dual-channel 
strategy outperforms retail-only and direct-only channel strategies in most cases. Geng 
and Mallik (2007) studied a similar problem, but examined the effect of 
manufacturer’s action of cut-off retailer’s order when having limited capacity.  
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Alptekinoglu and Tang (2005) developed a model of a dual-channel distribution 
network with multiple depots and multiple sales locations, and study the ordering and 
allocation policies for each depot to minimize the total distribution cost. In their model, 
the demand pooling effect and how the correlation between demands at sales locations 
influences the strategic choices are examined. Seifer et al. (2006) also studied the 
effect of inventory pooling in a dual-channel supply chain. Specifically, they propose a 
channel coordination strategy of using excess stock at retail stores to fill some online 
orders, and conclude that this strategy derives significant reduction in channel stock 
and lost sales.  
Dumrongsiri et al. (2006) is the only work on analysis of the pricing and inventory 
replenishment problem in a hybrid market with intermediary and direct selling.  They 
derived the demand function from consumer’s choice model and analyze the effects of 
demand uncertainty on the equilibrium prices. 
The results of the above paper show that inventory cost could impact profits 
significantly. Thus, differing from existing literature in this area (e.g. Tsay and 
Agrawal, 2004; Chiang et al., 2003; Cattani et al. 2006), we pay more attention to the 
inventory part in Chapter 4. Contrasting to the studies of inventory control policy as 
papers reviewed here, we integrate the joint pricing and inventory decisions in dual-
channel system with consideration of inter-channel excess demand shifting.  
Chapter 3 Pricing Competition in a Dual-Channel Distribution System 
  15 
CHAPTER 3 PRICING COMPETITION IN A 
DUAL-CHANNEL 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
Though double marginalization has been widely studied in bilateral distribution 
channel systems, interactions between independent manufacturer and retailer become 
more complicated when direct channel is considered, as horizontal and vertical 
competition exist simultaneously. Here horizontal competition arises when 
manufacturer’s direct channel competes with retailer’s shop for the same pool of 
customers. The vertical competition refers to the buyer-seller’s competition which 
brings forth double-marginalization. In this case, customers’ channel preferences and 
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the price competition between these two channels play critical roles in determining 
their individual sales volumes and profits as well as those of the whole distribution 
system. If direct channel is targeted at retailer’s least profitable customers, 
manufacturer and retailer could both benefit with appropriate resell prices. Chiang et al. 
(2003) showed that direct marketing makes the manufacturer more profitable by 
posing a viable threat to draw customers away from the retailer and alleviate the 
degree of double marginalization when there is a deterministic relationship between 
consumer’s reservation prices of retail channel and direct channel. Cattani et al. (2006) 
presented an equal price strategy based on a linear customer utility model where each 
customer has an independent preference for direct and traditional channels. We extend 
their works to consider the case that customers have independent random reservation 
prices and resell prices at these two channels could be unequal.  
In this chapter, we study the pure competition pricing strategy in a dual-channel 
supply chain where a monopolist manufacturer sells its product through a traditional 
retail channel as well as to consumers directly (Figure 1.1). The manufacturer supplies 
the exclusive retailer at a wholesale price w and directly sells to consumer at price pd; 
while the retailer sells its product to consumer at price pr. Merchandising costs per unit 
cd and cr, including the cost of selling and logistics, are incurred when product is sold 
at direct channel and the retail shop, respectively. Without loss of generality, we ignore 
the manufacturing cost for it is common for products sold in both two channels. A 
consumer will either purchase from one of the two channels or nothing at all, 
depending on selling price and his own reservation price.  
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3.1 Channel Demands 
In this section, we introduce our distribution system consisting of an exclusive retail 
channel and a manufacturer own direct selling channel first, and then derive the 
channel demand functions from a customer choice model.  
3.1.1 Consumer choice model 
Consumer chooses the purchase channel based on price and his own reservation price 
(alternatively called “willingness to pay” or “consumption value”). This reservation 
price depends on customer’s service preference and the channel service outputs. A 
direct channel always provides different service outputs from a traditional bricks-and-
mortar shop. Take online sale as an example. Online-shop, one of the most extensively 
used form of direct marketing, usually provides consumers with only virtual 
description of the product and delayed indoor delivery; while traditional bricks-and-
mortar shop can provide consumers with real inspection and immediate possession. On 
the other hand, different consumers have different needs for the service outputs, and 
even the same consumer would have different service needs under different situations. 
Consequently, consumers have different reservation prices of buying product from 
these two channels. We denote the reservation price for buying from these retailers by 
vr, and from direct channel by vd.  
We assume that consumers are homogenous in the valuation of the product, and for 
each consumer, ),0(~ rr Uv α , ),0(~ dd Uv α , where αr (or αd) is the highest possible 
price that customer would like to spend on this product in a retail shop (or in the direct 
resale channel). This uniform distribution assumption is extensively used in marketing 
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research, for it is usually the situation that marketing managers only know a possible 
range of consumers’ willingness to pay, especially for new product.  
Actually, there are two studies related to our research. One is Cattani et al. (2006). 
They presented an equal price strategy based on a linear customer utility model where 
each customer has an independent preference for direct and traditional channels. But 
we study the optimal pricing strategy allowing these two entities to set different prices. 
This would be more realistic and likely for manufacturer to adopt, because 
differentiating prices could provide higher profits. The other is Chiang et al. (2003), 
assuming a multiplicative relationship between vr and vd, i.e. d rv vθ= , where θ is called 
consumer channel preference and constant over the whole population. In contrast, vr 
and vd are assumed to be independent random variables in our research to capture the 
behavior of a more flexible and random consumer population. It is true that there might 
be certain internal relationship between vr and vd, as they evaluations for the same 
product. However, there are too many external factors beyond the product itself, such 
as methods of product briefing at different channels, customer’s locations, 
manufacturer’s brand image, sales force, can influence customer’s preference and 
reservation price. These intangible factors, along with how they would impact 
customer, are hard to be captured by a simple multiplication with a constant parameter. 
So, to keep this problem tractable, we assume these two parameters to be independent 
here. The demand functions are changed from linear to quadratic, which greatly 
increase the complexity of this problem.  
We model an individual customer’s utility ui as a function of both selling price and 
his reservation price at channel i from which the product is purchased:  
i i iu v p= − , { },i r d∈ . 
Chapter 3 Pricing Competition in a Dual-Channel Distribution System 
  19 
In addition, u0 denotes the utility customer could obtain from an outside option. And 
without loss of generality, we assume that uo = 0. To maximize his/her own utility, 
customer purchases from the channel providing the highest utility. If uo > max{ur, ud}, 
the customer will not buy this product from either channel and refer to an outside 
option. Thus, consumer purchases from channel i ( { }, ,i r d o∈ ): 
{ }odr uuui ,,maxarg= . 
3.1.2 Demands  
To determine the demand curves, we first consider the supply chain structure prior to 
the manufacturer’s introduction of a direct selling channel only with traditional retailer. 
When a product is sold through traditional distribution channel with an outside retail 
store, consumer will buy this product if 0r rv p− ≥ . Thus, assuming ),0(~ rr Uv α , the 
probability that a customer buying from the retail shop is 1 r
r
p
α− , for 0 r rp α≤ ≤ .   
With the addition of a direct channel, the probability that a customer buys from the 
traditional store or direct resale channel will be calculated over appropriate regions of 
the joint distribution of vr and vd. Figure 3.1 illustrates the case when r d r dp p α α− ≤ − . 
Consumer buys from traditional store, when 
{ } { }max ,0 max ,0r d d du u v p≥ = − . 
Thus, the probability that a customer buys from the traditional store is given by 
  { }{ }P r m ax , 0r r dq u u= ≥  
 { } { }Pr 0 Pr 0 0r d d d d r d du v p v p u v p= ≥ − − ≥ + ≥ − ≤  
 
0
1 1 1 1d r d r
d d d r r
p
r d r dp v p p p
d r d r
dv dv dv dv
α α α
α α α α− +
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
Chapter 3 Pricing Competition in a Dual-Channel Distribution System 
  20 
( )221
2




+ −= −                                                                (3.1) 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Channel demands based on consumers’ willingness-to-pay 
( r d r dp p α α− ≤ − ) 
 
Since the probability that consumer buys from either channel is1 r d
r d
p p
α α− , the probability 
that a customer buys from the direct resale channel is given by 
1 r dd r
r d
p pq qα α= − −       
( )2 2 2
2
d d r d r d
r d
p p p pα α
α α
− + −=                                                      (3.2) 
Similarly, Figure 3.2 illustrates the case when drdr pp αα −>− .  
{ }}0,max{Pr drr uuq ≥=  





























22 2−+−                                                       (3.3) 
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− += −                                                     (3.4) 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Channel demands based on consumers’ willingness-to-pay 
( r d r dp p α α− ≥ − ) 
 
Lemma 3.1 The probability functions that a customer buys from retailer channel qr 
and direct channel qd are continuously differentiable in the region of 
( ){ }, | 0 ,0r d r r d dR p p p pα α= ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ .  
Proof First we prove that qr is continuously differentiable. As qr is an integration of 
two simple functions, we only need to prove that on the boundary r d r dp p α α− = − it 
is differentiable and the derivatives are continuous. Both equations (3.1) and (3.3) give 







22 −= , which means that qr is continuous. In addition, the 
partial derivative of qr with respect to pr based on equation (3.1) is  
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 .                                                          (3.5) 











.                                            (3.6) 










, which exactly equals to equation 
(3.5). These mean that qr is continuous derivable with respect to pr on [0,αr].  










;                                                  










.                                              
These two derivatives are also equal on the boundary r d r dp p α α− = − . Thus we show 
that qr is a continuously differentiable function in region R. 
Similarly, we find that qd is continuously differentiable over the region R. Both 







22 −= ,                                                         (3.7) 


















,                                                (3.8) 
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 .                                        (3.9) 
□ 
Note that qr and qd are not twice continuously differentiable. On the boundary 

















∂ per equation 
(3.3). This inequality could also be found for other second derivatives.  
Figure 3.3 plots the probabilities that a customer would buy from each channel as a 
function of the channel price with given price at the other channel. We can see that, for 
both channels, the probability of customer choosing channel i is linear when the price 
at channel i is relatively low compared to that at the other channel, and it becomes 
quadratic when the channel price exceeds a certain value. Moreover, the line and the 
quadratic curve are tangent on the boundary r d r dp p α α− = − . 
ddr p+−αα  
(a)  
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Figure 3.3 Channel demands (a) Retailer (b) Direct Channel 
3.2 Pricing Strategy 
3.2.1 Centralized SC  
Under centralized decision making, a vertically integrated firm controls all three 
decisions: manufacturing, traditional retailing, and the direct marketing. As customer 
could access either the retail shop or the direct channel, the firm should make 
appropriate pricing decision for these two channels according to customer’s 
consumption value distribution so that it could achieve profit-maximized customer 
segmentation. Given the customer’s purchasing probability functions in equations from 
(3.1) to (3.4), if the vertically integrated firm sets retail price pr and direct market price 
pd, then the expected profit per customer it would earn is  
 ( ) ( ) ( ),I r d r r r d d dp p p c q p c qπ = − + −                                     (3.10) 
where cr and cd are marginal costs incurred by the manufacturer for the product sold 
through the retailer and direct market, respectively.  
Since ( , )I r dp pπ  is a continuous function on the bounded area 
( ){ }, | 0 ,0r d r r d dR p p p pα α= ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ , there exists pricing strategy ( ),r dp p  in R 
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giving the maximum value of Iπ . If either channel’s price was set to the upper bound 
of customer’s consumption value (αr or αd), the probability that customer chooses that 
channel becomes zero, which is equivalent to the single channel situation and out of 
our research scope in this section. Also, the firm cannot price either channel to zero, or 
customer could definitely purchase from that channel resulting in a negative system 
profit. Because all the points on the boundary of R do not result in positive value of 
profit, we know the optimal pricing strategy ( )** , dr pp must be a stationary point of 
( , )I r dp pπ  located in the inner set of R , i.e. ( )** , dr pp  should 
satisfy 0I
rp
π∂ =∂ and 0
I
dp
π∂ =∂ .  
As the functions of the probability that customer chooses each channel have 
different forms with the relationship between  dr pp −   and dr αα − , we will figure out 
all the stationary points in R in the following two cases, drdr pp αα −≤− and 
drdr pp αα −>− , respectively (Figure 3.4). The optimal price strategy ( )** , dr pp  




    
 
 







drdr pp αα −>−  
Case 1 
drdr pp αα −≤−
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Case 1 drdr pp αα −≤−  
The stationary points in this range should satisfy 0I
rp
π∂ =∂ and 0
I
dp
π∂ =∂ .  
By setting 0I
rp
π∂ =∂ and 0
I
dp
























α  ,                    (3.12) 
which result in ( *1rp , 
*
1dp ) where 
1
2 23 2(2 ) 2 2 2
4r
d d d d r d d d r d d
d
p c p c cp α α α α α αα
∗ − + + + − + −=                     (3.13) 
and 
( )1 2 2 2 21 3 2 9 6 2 2 23d r d d r r r r r d d r d d r d dp p c c p c p c c c c c cα α α α∗ = + + − − − + + + − + − . (3.14) 
The solutions of equation (3.13) and (3.14) ( )1 1,r dp p∗ ∗ are candidates of the optimal 
pricing strategy if it satisfies the condition drdr pp αα −≤− . Actually we have 
another solution of pd, 
( )2 2 2 21 3 2 9 6 2 2 23 r d d r r r r r d d r d d r d dp c c p c p c c c c c cα α α α+ + − + − + + + − + −  (3.15) 






∂ π , we find that   
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∂ π , it could not be a local maximum 
point. Thus in the region of drdr pp αα −<−  the optimal prices can only come out 
from equation (3.13) and (3.14). It is possible that there are more than one the solution 
of equation (3.13) and (3.14). In this case, we only need to keep the pairs satisfying 
drdr pp αα −≤−  and providing the highest value of  ( , )I r dp pπ .  
If none of the roots of equation (3.13) and (3.14) falls into the range 
drdr pp αα −≤− , it indicates that profit function ( , )I r dp pπ keeps increasing till the 
bound r d r dp p α α− = − and the optimal ( )** , dr pp  does not exist in this range.  
Case 2 drdr pp αα −>−  
Similarly, we could find the stationary points in Case 2 by solving 
0I
rp
π∂ =∂ and 0
I
dp
π∂ =∂ with qr in equation (3.3) and qd in equation (3.4).  If no stationary 
point is found in this area, it means that the profit decreases monotonously and the 
optimal pair of prices ( )** , dr pp  would occur in Case 1.  
By setting 0I
rp
π∂ =∂ and 0
I
dp




2dp ) should 
satisfy the following two equations 
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.                              (3.17) 
Then we could obtain 




2 23 2(2 ) 2 2 2
4d
r r r r d r r r d r r
r
p c p c cp α α α α α αα
∗ − + + + − + −= .             (3.19) 
Similarly, we could also show that the other root of pr from equation (3.16),  
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+++−+−++ rrdrdrrrdddddrrd ccccccpcpccp αααα 22269233
1 2222 , 





∂ π . Thus the candidates of the optimal price pair in 
Case 2 can only come out from ( )*2*2 , dr pp .  
If either ( )1 1,r dp p∗ ∗ or ( )2 2,r dp p∗ ∗ falls into its feasible region, the feasible one is our 
optimal solution. If both ( )1 1,r dp p∗ ∗ and ( )2 2,r dp p∗ ∗  are feasible solutions, we choose the 
one providing higher total profit Iπ .  
Next we look at the special case of Case 1 that r d r dp p α α− = − . In this case, the 
optimal price pair ( )*3*3 , dr pp  is 
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( ) ( )( )3 21 2 2 2 2 126r d r d r d r d r r d d d d rp c c c c c cα α α α α α α α∗ = + − + + + − + + + − ,     
(3.20)  
( ) ( )( )3 21 4 4 2 2 126d d r d r d r d r r d d d d rp c c c c c cα α α α α α α α∗ = + + − + + − + + + − .      
(3.21) 
Specifically, we can see that when cr = cd and r dα α= ,  
     ( )2 21 33r d r r rp p c c α∗ ∗= = + + .                                   (3.22)  
However, in the situation that there is only retail shop distribution channel, system 
profit  



























π 11  .                                   (3.24) 




cp += α which is less than or equal to the optimal 
price shown in equation (3.22) in dual-channel distribution system when cr = cd and 
r dα α= . This is because  
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The equality of ** r
S
r pp = occurs only when cr = cd = r dα α= . One reason to this 
phenomenon is that in dual-channel distribution system, customer with low 
consumption value for retail channel might have high consumption value for direct 
channel. In this case, the lost demand at retail channel whose consumption value for 
direct channel is higher than direct selling price could be captured by that channel. 
Therefore, manufacturer is able to adjust the price in dual channel system a little higher 
than that in single channel system, as long as the possibility that customer buys the 
product from either of these two channels holds large enough to generate higher 
system profit.   
3.2.2 Decentralized SC competition and coordination 
In this subsection, we analyze the pricing strategy of manufacturer and traditional 
retailer in a decentralized supply chain where each of the two entities looks at his own 
profit when setting the price.  
We incorporate the direct channel into the Stackelberg game model to examine the 
interaction between the manufacturer and the retailer. A Stackelberg game is a one-
round game introduced by the German economist Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg 
(Gibbons, 1992). There are two players in the game: the leader moves first, then the 
follower moves, and then the game is over. The follower optimizes its own objective 
function, knowing the leader's move. The leader, sometimes referred to as the market 
leader, has to optimize its own objective function by anticipating the optimal response 
of the follower.  
In our case, manufacturer is the game leader who is able to predict retailer’s 
response to his wholesale price and direct price decisions. In the first stage, 
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manufacturer decides whether to engage in direct sales, and sets the wholesale price w 
as well as direct selling price pd (if the direct channel is opened). To keep the retailer 
from buying through the direct channel or other arbitrators with a lower price, we 
require dw p≤ . Manufacturer maximizes its expected profit per customer, 
( )m r d d dwq p c qπ = + − , taking the retailer’s expected decision with given w and pd 
into account, where qr and qd are the probabilities that a customer buys from each 
channel. In the second stage, the retailer, as a follower, chooses the retail price pr to 
maximize its profit ( )r r r rp w c qπ = − − . In the remainder of this subsection we solve 
this problem backwards, first retailer’s optimal decisions upon any possible 
manufacturer’s behavior, and then manufacturer’s decision by anticipating retailer’s 
reaction. 
3.2.2.1  Retailer’s pricing reaction 
Given manufacturer’s pricing decisions, retailer chooses the optimal pr to maximize its 
profit ( | , ) ( ) ( | )r r d r r r r dp p w p w c q p pπ = − − ⋅ . As shown in Figure 3.3(a), 
( | ) r r dq p p is a piecewise function with a line segment and a curve segment. 
According to Lemma 3.1, ( | ) r r dq p p  is continuously differentiable over [0, αr]. So, 
retailer’s profit function with given pd and w is also continuously differentiable over [0, 
αr]. Since pr = 0 or αr leads to non-positive profit, the optimal price of retail channel 
should be a stationary point of ( )| ,r r dp p wπ .  
As ( | ) r r dq p p has different expressions in the range of [ ]ddr p+−αα,0  and 
( ], rddr p ααα +− , we first find out the stationary points of ( )| ,r r dp p wπ with qr in 
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equation (3.1) and (3.3) separately. The optimal pr is the feasible one among these 
stationary points that generates the highest profit.     
Case 1 ddrr pp +−≤ αα  
In this case, qr follows the form in equation (3.1), which is a linear decreasing 
function, ( )| ,r r dp p wπ  is a concave function with respect to pr for given pd and w. 
Then, by setting 0r
rp
















αα ,             (3.25) 








−−++= .                                       (3.26) 
Note that the feasibility of x1, despite that ddr px +−≤ αα1 , requires that 
rr xwc α<<+ 1 . rx α<1 is guaranteed under the natural constraint of rr wc α<+  
which stands for the profitability of retail channel. And wcx r +>1  is satisfied when 









that is,  
 ( ) 2)(2 ddrrd pwc −>−− ααα .                                     (3.27) 
Case 2 ddrr pp +−> αα  
As qr follows the form in equation (3.3), which is a quadratic function of pr,  
( )| ,r r dp p wπ  becomes a cubic function of pr. By setting 0r
rp
π∂ =∂ , i.e., 
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αα ,      (3.28) 
we obtain two stationary points  
( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ++−−−+++= 222 3223
1
ddrrrrd ppcwcwpx αα ,               (3.29) 
( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ++−−++++= 223 3223
1























π , only x2 is a local maximum point. In addition, 
noting that rr wc α<+  gives rise to 
( ) ( )222 43 drrddrrr pcwppcw +−−<++−−< ααα , 
we know that rr xwc α<<+ 2  and rx α>3 , which means that if ddr px +−> αα2  
then it is a feasible solution to retailer’s pricing problem. 
Therefore, each of these two cases has one local maximum, and retailer’s optimal 
price should be either one of these two points. To show the existence and uniqueness 
of the optimal solution, we first have the following lemma regarding the unimodality 
of ( )| ,r r dp p wπ on [0, αr].  
Lemma 3.2 Given pd and w, exactly one of the following three formulas is satisfied: 
i) ddr px +−< αα1 ; 
ii) ddr px +−> αα2 ; 
iii) ddr pxx +−== αα21 . 
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Proof Let ( ) ( )ddrd pxwpf +−−= αα11 , , ( ) ( )ddrd pxwpf +−−= αα22 , . The 
Lemma 3.2 is equivalent to 021 ≥⋅ ff  and the equality can be attained only when 
021 == ff .  
Firstly, we deduce the sufficient and necessary conditions of 01 =f and 02 =f . 









,                       (3.31) 
simplified to  
( ) ddddrrd ppwc αααα 232 22 +−=−+ .                       (3.32) 
So equation (3.32) is equivalent to ddr px +−= αα1 .  And  
On the other hand, from 





⎛ ++−−−+−++−= ddrrdrrd ppcwcwp ααα ,  (3.33) 
we know  
( ) =+−−− drrd pcwαα3 ( ) 22 3 ddrr ppcw ++−−α .             (3.34) 
Letting ( )drrd pcwA +−−−≡ αα3 , ( ) 22 3 ddrr ppcwB ++−−≡ α ,  
( ) ( )( )22222 33 ddrrrrd ppcwcwpBA ++−−−+−++−=− ααα  
( )rrddddd cwpp αααα −++−−= 6639 22  
( )( )rrddddd wcpp αααα −++−−= 2233 22 .                            (3.35) 
Equation (3.34) implies that A=B and 022 =− BA . So we obtain the necessary 
condition of 02 =f is ( ) ddddrrd ppwc αααα 232 22 +−=−+ which is exactly the 
same as equation (3.32). In addition, under this condition,  
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ppppcw αααααααα .  
Thus equation (3.22) is the necessary and sufficient condition of 02 =f . Hence, we 
proved 021 =⋅ ff  can be attained only when 021 == ff , i.e., ddr pxx +−== αα21 . 
Next, we show that 021 >⋅ ff when f1 and f2 are not equal to zero. Suppose 01 <f  










( ) ddddrrd ppwc αααα 232 22 +−<−+ .                                (3.36) 
Then from ddr px +−> αα2  we know  
)(2 ddr px +−− αα = 
( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ++−−−+−++− 22 333
1
ddrrdrrd ppcwcwp ααα >0.           (3.37) 
When A > 0 and B > 0, 22 BA −  is positive because it has the same sign as that of 
equation (3.37). So equation (3.35) is larger than zero, which implies 
( ) ddddrrd ppwc αααα 232 22 +−>−+  . This contradicts equation (3.36). Thus,  
01 <f  and 02 >f cannot held simultaneously.   
Similarly, we show that 01 >f  and 02 <f , i.e., ddr px +−> αα1  and 
ddr px +−< αα2 , also do not hold simultaneously. As 01 >f ,  
( ) ddddrrd ppwc αααα 232 22 +−>−+ .                         (3.38) 
Then we have 
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pp ααααα . 
But from equation (3.35) we know 
( )( )rrddddd wcppBA αααα −++−−=− 2233 2222  
( ) 023233 2222 =+−+−−> dddddddd pppp αααα . 
This indicates A > B; or equivalently 02 >f . So it is not possible that 01 >f  and 
02 <f  hold simultaneously.  
Hence, we proof 021 >⋅ ff . □ 
Remark. We can also explain Lemma 3.2 from the perspective of derivative of  


















π . Since 

























π . Because the other stationary point x3 is 
















π . As 
( )| ,r r dp p wπ is continuously differentiable over [0, αr], we know that 





π . ( )| ,r r dp p wπ  with 
qr in equation (3.3) has only two stationary points; and the local minimum point x3 is 
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larger than the local maximum point x2. So from the continuous differentiability of  
( )| ,r r dp p wπ over [0, αr], we know that ddr px +−= αα2 .  
Figure 3.5 provides a visual illustration of Lemma 3.2. The plot in Figure 3.5 (a) 
shows the case that ddr px +−< αα1  and ddr px +−< αα2 . We can see that x1 is 
the only one local maximum of  ( )| ,r r dp p wπ when p is in the range of [0, αr]. The 
plot in Figure 3.5 (b) shows the case that both x1 and x2 are larger than ddr p+−αα , 
and in which x2 becomes the only one local maximum of  ( )| ,r r dp p wπ on [0, αr]. 
Figure 3.5 (c) shows the case that ddr pxx +−== αα21 . So the only local maximum 
is ddr p+−αα .  
ddr p+−αα
  ( )| ,r r dp p wπ
 
(a) 
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ddr p+−αα




  ( )| ,r r dp p wπ
 
(c) 
Figure 3.5 Illustration of Lemma 3.2 
 
Lemma 3.2 suggests that ( )| ,r r dp p wπ has only one local maximum point over [0, 
αr], either x1, or x2, or ddr pxx +−== αα21 . Thus we obtain the following theorem 
on retailer’s optimal price *rp . 
Theorem 3.1 i) When pd and w fall into the region 









* −−++= ;                                       (3.39) 
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especially, when ( ) ddddrrd ppwc αααα 232 22 +−=−+ , ddrr pp +−= αα* ; 
ii) When pd and w fall into the region 
( ) ( ){ }ddddrrdd ppwcwp αααα 232,=R 222 +−>−+ , the optimal resell price  
( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ++−−−+++= 22* 3223
1
ddrrrrdr ppcwcwpp αα .                  (3.40) 
Proof  When pd and w fall in R1, equation (3.32) shows that x1< ddr p+−αα , and 
Lemma 3.2 suggests that x2 < ddr p+−αα . This is just the case shown in Figure 3.5 (a) 
where x1 is the only possible optimal solution. Noting that 
( )222 23 dddddd ppp −>−− ααα , we know x1 is larger than wcr +  per equation 
(3.27) and so is feasible. Therefore, when 1),( Rwpd ∈ , pr* = x1. The special case in 
( ) ddddrrd ppwc αααα 232 22 +−=−+  is the plot shown in Figure 3.5 (c). Similarly, 
we can show that when 2),( Rwpd ∈  both x1 and x2 are larger than ddr p+−αα  
(Figure 3.5 (b)). And as rr xwc α<<+ 2 , we have pr* = x2. □  
3.2.2.2 Manufacturer’s pricing problem 
With the anticipation of retailer’s reaction functions, the manufacturer’s problem is to 
maximize its own profit by choosing wholesale price w and direct price pd subject to 
dw p≤ . The manufacturer cannot do price discrimination by charging a higher 
wholesale price than direct sale price, because the retailer would switch its purchase to 
the direct channel and refuse to pay higher wholesale price.  As we can see, 
manufacturer becomes much more powerful than retailer after the addition of direct 
channel. 
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Following retailer’s expected response with given manufacturer’s decision, we 
need to examine manufacturer’s decisions in two regions R1 and R2 in Theorem 3.1 
respectively, and then fix the region of (pd, w) which provides the higher profit.  
First, consider region 
( ) ( ){ }ddddrrdd ppwcwp αααα 232,=R 221 +−≤−+ , 
where retailer’s expected price pr follows equation (3.39), qr follows equation (3.1) and 





m r d d dw p
wq p c qπ = + −  
        s.t.  ( ) ddddrrd ppwc αααα 232 22 +−≤−+  
              dp w≥  
              0 d dp α≤ ≤   
              0 r rw cα≤ ≤ −  
Similarly, we can model manufacturer’s pricing problem in R2 as DOP 2, where 
retailer’s expected price pr follows equation (3.40), qr follows equation (3.3) and qd 





m r d d dw p
wq p c qπ = + −  
        s.t.  ( ) ddddrrd ppwc αααα 232 22 +−>−+  
              dp w≥  
              0 d dp α≤ ≤   
              0 r rw cα≤ ≤ −  
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3.2.2.3 Algorithm 
We will apply searching method to solve manufacturer’s problem. Regarding DOP1, 
for each possible pd, as 




























1 ,          













1 .            (3.42) 
If ),min(0 rrd cpw −≤ α , the optimal wholesale price 0ww* = ; or, =*w ( )rrd cp −α,min .  
Regarding DOP2, due to the complexity of derivatives of pr in equation (3.40) with 
respect to pd and w, exhaustive method is used to find out the optimal pair of (pd, w).  
Since DOP1 and DOP2 have non-overlapping feasible regions, any pair of (pd, w) 
could be feasible solution for only one of these two. For each possible value of pd, as 
dpw ≤<0 , it could only be feasible solution to DOP1 with any possible value of w 
when ( )rrddd cp −−≥ ααα 23 22  and only to DOP2 when  
( )rrddddd cpp −−<+ αααα 232 22 .  When 
( ) dddrrddd ppcp αααα 223 222 +≤−−< , 
that is, 
( ) ( )rrddddrrdd cpc −−<≤−+− ααααααα 232 2 , 
it depends on the value of w to determine which problem we should look into. When  
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1 , (pd, w) falls in R1 and becomes a feasible 
solution of DOP1; otherwise, it falls in feasible region of DOP2.  
Let X= ( )rrdd c+−ααα2 , Y= ( )rrdd c−− ααα 23 2 , and 





1 . The solution approach is as follows: 
(1) Exhaustively search each Xpc dd ≤≤ and ),min(0 rrd cpw −≤≤ α for DOP2. 
a. Discrete the range of [ ]Xcd , with step size η1 into series { }nddd ppp ,,, 10 K , 
and   dd cp =0 , Xp nd = .  
b. Discrete the range [ ]),min(,0 rrd cp −α  with step size η2 into series 
{ }mwww ,...,, 10 , and   00 =w , ( )rrdm cpw −= α,min .  
c.  For each idp (i = 0, …,n), calculate the value of objective function for each 
wj (j = 0, …,m), and record the pair  providing maximum objective value.  
(2) Exhaustively search each YpX d << and ),min( rrd cpwZ −≤≤ α for 
DOP2; the detailed method is the same as step (1).  
(3) For each YpX d << , the optimal w of DOP1 is w1=min (w0, Z).  
(4) For each  ddpY α≤≤ , the optimal w of DOP1 is w2=min (w0, pd). 
(5) Check all the above optimums and choose the pair that provides the highest 
profit.  
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3.3 Numerical Studies 
3.3.1 An illustrative example 
In this subsection we present a numerical example to illustrate the solution to pricing 
optimization problem of a dual-channel distribution system. The related input 
parameters are given as αr = 10, αd = 8, cr = cd = 2. The results are shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Numerical Example Results 
 
 









Retail Price 6 6.35456 8 7.90 
Wholesale Price n/a n/a 4 4.31 
Direct Price n/a 5.44 n/a 5.14 
Retailer Demands 0.4 0.324 0.2 0.16 
Direct Channel Demands n/a 0.244 n/a 0.33 
Retailer Profits n/a n/a 0.4 0.25 
Manufacturer Profits n/a n/a 0.8 1.73 
Total Profits 1.6 2.25 1.2 1.98 
 
The first two columns of Table 3.1 show the pricing strategy in a vertically 
integrated firm that optimizes the total expected profit of the direct channel and the 
traditional channel jointly over pr and pd for single channel system and dual-channel 
system. We can see that adding a direct channel leads to a higher price at the 
traditional retailer and a lower price at the direct channel. This is because the 
consumers’ consumption value at the retailer is a bit higher than that at the direct 
channel. Total demand at these two channels is increased and so is the total profit. The 
last two columns show the pricing strategies when the manufacturer and retailer act as 
independent firms and compete with each other. It is shown that retailer’s profit 
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decreases 37.5% while manufacturer’s profit increases 116.25%. Furthermore, we can 
see from Table 3.1 that the total profit under centralized decision making is much 
higher than that under decentralized system. Hence, the opportunity that manufacturer 
and retailer both could achieve higher profits exists. Profit sharing strategies would be 
worth for studying.  
3.3.2 Parametric analysis 
To gain managerial insights of the dual-channel distribution system, we investigate 
impact of consumer’s preference of the direct channel and direct selling cost cd on our 
pricing strategy using the models described in this chapter.  
Similar to Cattani et al. (2006), we define d
r
k αα=  to represent consumer’s relative 
channel preference. When k < 1, consumer has lower average consumption value of 
buying from direct channel versus the retail shop; otherwise, consumption value is 
higher at direct channel.  
First we study the vertical integrated supply chain model. Figure 3.6 shows the 
impact of k on pricing strategy and channel demands. We note that in Figure 3.6 (a) the 
prices of both channels rise as k increases. And retail price in a vertically integrated 
dual-channel system is a little higher than that in a vertically integrated single channel 
system. In addition, Figure 3.6 (b) indicates the total demand also increases because 
the direct demand grows at a faster rate than retailer demand falls down at as the retail 
price increases. As αd increases, which means that customer’s reservation price for 
direct channel stochastically increases, manufacturer can raise the direct channel price 
to make more margin. Meanwhile, the possibility that customer would go to direct 
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channel grows up, resulting in decrease of retail demand. Then the manufacturer has to 
raise the price at retail channel to sustain profitability at the retail channel. These 
findings suggest that coordinated dual-channel distribution system could expand sales 






Figure 3.6 Impact of channel preference k on pricing strategy (αr = 10, cr = cd =2) 
under centralized decision making: (a) optimal prices, (b) demands  
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In the case of cr = cd, we can see from Figure 3.6(a) that pr > pd when r dα α>  and 
pr < pd when r dα α< . We plot the difference between pr and pd in Figure 3.7. It is 
shown here that these two differences are positively related, which follows our 
intuition that greater difference in acceptance between these two channels leads to 
larger difference between two prices. In addition, we can see that 
r d r dp p α α− < − when k < 1 (i.e., r dα α> ) and r d r dp p α α− > − when k > 1 (i.e., 
r dα α< ). This observation would simplify the price determination process stated in 
Section 3.2.1. If dr αα ≥ , the optimal price pair falls into the area of Case 1 in Figure 
3.4 and could be determined by equations (3.13) and (3.14); otherwise, it is as Case 2 
and could be determined by equations (3.18) and (3.19).  Indeed, we can see from 
Figure 3.7 that these two cases are central symmetric to the point of dr αα = , which 
means that these two channels are symmetrically priced according to dr αα  and in the 



















Figure 3.7 Difference between pr and pd 
 
Now we consider the pricing strategy of independent competing manufacturer and 
retailer. Figure 3.8 shows that, though retailer price and wholesale price increase as k 
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increases, the increments are small so that they are almost the same as in the case of 
single channel. When direct channel is much less preferred than the retail shop (k < 
0.5), direct price is very low, which restricts the wholesale price since it is required 
that dw p≤  to prevent retailer buying from direct channel. The lower wholesale price 
leads to lower retailer price and higher retailer profits. However, retailer’s profit 
shrinks sharply as dα approaches rα  since its market power drops quickly. From the 
graph, we can see that the retailer’s profit decreases, but it does not seem to approach 
zero. To explain this phenomenon, we let αd approach infinity, and then pd would also 
approach infinity with a slower rate. This is because that pd is monotonically 
increasing as αd. As αd increases, which means that customer’s reservation price for 
direct channel stochastically increases, manufacturer can raise the direct channel price 
to make more margin. The reason the increasing rate of pd is lower than that of αd is 
that manufacturer need to restrict the rate to boost the demand as well as margin to 
achieve the highest profitability. But pr stays at a finite value leading to a positive 
demand at the retailer and giving rise to a positive profit.  Thus, a direct channel is 
highly detrimental to retailer in most cases, except when direct channel is far less 
preferred to retailer shop; it is consistent with what we have seen in reality where 
retailer is always opposed to this action.  
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Figure 3.8  Impact of channel preference k on pricing strategy (αr =10, cr = cd =2) 
under decentralized decision making: (a) optimal prices (b) demands 
 
From manufacturer’s point of view, introduction of a direct channel raises its 
market power by weakening that of retailer. Figure 3.9 shows a set of manufacturer’s 
profit curves with different values of cd. Even with a significant disadvantage of the 
direct channel (cd = 4 vs. cr = 2), manufacturer has strong incentive to open a direct 
channel. Considering retailer’s strong opposition to the direct channel, the most serious 
problem for a manufacturer to open a direct channel would be to persuade retailer to 
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accept this marketing strategy. Profits-sharing strategy would be studied further. 
Another point that needs to be highlighted in this graph is that higher valuation of 
direct channel brings more profit increment for the overall supply chain. It is obviously 
a strong incentive for manufacturer to improve the service quality at the direct channel.     
 
 
Figure 3.9  Impact of cd on manufacturer profit 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we focus on the competing pricing strategy in a dual-channel 
distribution system. With the probabilities that customer would purchase from each 
channel deriving from consumer choice model, we obtain the optimal prices under 
centralized decision making as a benchmark. Then, under decentralized decision 
making, we built up a two-stage Stackelberg game model to study the simultaneously 
horizontal and vertical competition between a monopolistic manufacturer and retailer.  
Our research shows that adding one more channel could significantly increase total 
profit in both centralized and decentralized supply chains, but the effects of horizontal 
and vertical competitions reduce this increase in decentralized one. Unlike a traditional 
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distribution structure in which double-marginalization and substitutability tend to 
counteract, channel inefficiencies are always present and enlarge as customer’s 
consumption value on direct channel grows up. We also examine the impact of 
variable cost at direct channel on manufacturer’s profit. Even with a significant 
disadvantage of direct channel, manufacturer has strong incentive to open direct 
channel. However, due to dramatic damage to retailer’s profit, how to persuade retailer 
to accept and cooperate should be a substantial topic to work on.  
Although we only investigate in this model manufacturer and retailer’s pricing 
decisions with constant unit merchandising cost, inventory decision as one of the most 
important ordinary operations is worth studying in dual-channel distribution system. In 
the following chapter, we will do research on this problem. 
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CHAPTER 4 JOINT PRICE AND INVENTORY 
DECISION WITH DYNAMIC 
CUSTOMER CHOICE 
 
There are a few common characteristics among the manufacturers adopting dual-
channel distribution system. Firstly, the products in dual-channel supply chains usually 
have short life cycles. For instance, the life cycle of fashion products, like Nike, is just 
one season about 3 to 6 months (McIntyre and Perlman, 2000). Consumer electronics, 
due to rapid development of high technologies, usually refresh every 12 to 18 months. 
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Facing long production lead times and short product life cycles, manufacturers need to 
acquire precise demand information and to broaden market coverage, which is exactly 
the reason for popularity of dual-channel supply chains.  
Secondly, these manufacturers usually have certain market power and a population 
of brand loyal customers, so that they could control the market prices to avoid throat-
cutting price competition and sustain a stable brand reputation when facing fierce 
inter-channel substitution. According to various marketing literature, it is not advisable 
for small companies or non-famous manufacturers to open direct channel, because 
uncontrollable inter-channel conflicts would severely destroy the relationship with 
existing retailers, and result in disastrous damage to the manufacturer itself.     
We focus on the problem of stock levels balance between these two channels and 
the optimal price of product, combining independent retail distribution channel with a 
direct channel. Due to the long production lead times and short product life cycles, 
retailers have to place orders to manufacturers firstly, and manufacturers have to 
decide production capacity and finish the production before the beginning of the 
selling season. Facing a dual-channel supply chain, manufacturers’ inventories cover 
both retailers’ orders and customer demands at direct channel. Since the inventory for 
retailer orders is make-to-order, while that for demands at direct channel is make-to-
stock, manufacturers have to forecast the direct channel demands. As independent 
retailers and manufacturer direct channel hold inventory separately, it is observed that, 
when stock-out occurs at retail channel, unmet customer demands at the retailer would 
shift to direct channel. In contrast, when stock-out occurs at direct channel, customers 
usually will not visit a local retailer, but they may shift to another brand with similar 
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product, resulting in lost sales (Dai et al., 2006). Thus, different from retailer’s 
ordering decision, manufacturers have to consider the part of unfulfilled demand at 
retail channel that would probably shift to direct channel.  
However, this kind of demand shifting has been widely ignored among literatures 
on dual-channel supply chain, except Geng and Mallik (2007) who consider a capacity 
allocation game with heterogeneous market price. Actually, there are scarce studies on 
both price and inventory decisions in dual-channel supply chains.  The objective of this 
study is to examine how these operational decisions would be impacted by the inter-
channel shifting of excess demands and also the optimal profits.    
In this chapter, we study the jointly optimal price and inventory decision in a single 
period general dual-channel supply chain model where a monopolist manufacturer 
sells its product to customers through a traditional retailer and also its own direct 
channel. Manufacturer sets identical resell price for both two channels to avoid inter-
channel price competition. Independent retailer announces its order quantity to 
manufacturer, and then manufacturer decides the production capacity. Special attention 
has been put on the effect of this inter-channel stock-out demand shifting on 
manufacturer’s pricing and capacity decision. We build up the distribution of the 
effective direct channel demand conditioning on retailer’s order quantity and resell 
price. Although retailer’s problem is a standard newsvendor problem, manufacturer’s 
decision is a combined two-stage price-setting newsvendor problem that no closed 
form solution could be obtained. As the optimal behaviors depend critically on the type 
of stochastic demand functions, we numerically study this problem based on two of the 
most frequently used classes of demand processes in the marketing and industrial 
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organization literature, one the linear demand function, the other the multinomial logit 
model (MNL). It is observed that the effect of inter-channel stock-out demand shifting 
on manufacturer’s capacity is quite sensitive to the retailer’s demand variance and the 
rate that spillover demand shifts, while that effect on optimal price is not so dramatic.  
4.1 The Model  
This chapter studies a single period joint pricing and inventory decision problem in a 
general dual-channel supply chain where a monopolist manufacturer sells its product to 
customers through a traditional retailer as well as its own direct channel (Figure 1.1). 
Several assumptions are made in this model.  
1) The manufacturer is a monopoly player in the market, and produces a single 
period/seasonal product.  
2) Different from the model in Chapter 3, manufacturer implements a control 
price policy and sets the same selling price p across retail channel and direct channel.  
To name a real instance of our model, we can look at the fresh launching period of 
iPhone. Though mobile phone market is quite mature, iPhone, with its smooth, almost 
button-free contours, elegance appearance and diverse ingenious features, attracted a 
large population of customers who disregarded other products in the market and were 
eager to experience this epoch-making phone. Since the development cycle of such a 
product would take at least 6-12 months, there was no competitor in the first half year 
and iPhone acts as a monopoly in the market. Customers can buy it through retailer as 
well as online channels. Its strong market power allows Apple to maintain the same 
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price at these two channels. But as time went by, various product experience reviews, 
rapid development of competing products, along with news of prompt launching of 
second generation iPhone, faded away customers desire for this product and changed 
the market significantly. iPhone lost its monopoly power and the value of this product 
shrieked. So for the first six months after launching, iPhone can be viewed as a single 
period monopoly product with same price across two distribution channels.   
3) A constant unit wholesale price contract between manufacturer and retailer is 
adopted here, and wholesale price kpw = , where k is a representative of firms’ 
bargaining power and assumed to be fixed among various products that the 
manufacturer sells to the retailer. This simple contract can be used when two firms 
have long-term co-operation in a supply chain keeping a stable value of k for various 
products.  
Then with given selling price and corresponding wholesale price, retailer 
determines its order quantity qr. Manufacturer at last builds up its capacity dr qqC += , 
where qd is manufacturer’s order quantity for the direct channel. Both the manufacturer 
and retailer have only one replenishment chance before the selling season. 
Manufacturer’s unit production cost is cp and direct channel unit selling cost is cd. 
Retailer’s unit selling cost is cr. At the end of selling season, all leftover inventories 
could be salvaged at value of v.  
The demand faced by each channel i ( { }dri ,∈ , where r = traditional retail channel 
and d = direct channel), Di, has a distribution that may depend on the resell price.  We 
assume that the demand variables are of the additive form, i.e.,  
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iii pyD ε+= )( ,                                                (4.1) 
where εi is a normal distributed random variable and independent of resale price p. The 
additive form implies that the variances of the channel demands are exogenous 
constants and also independent of resale price p. Without loss of generality, we 
normalize E(εi) = 0, { }dri ,∈ , so that E(Di) = yi(p). In other words, the functions yi(p) 
may be viewed as representing the expected channel sales volumes. Let Var(εi) = σi2, 
and then iii u σε =  where ui follows standard normal distribution whose cumulative 
distribution function is Φ(·) and probability density function is )(⋅φ . For analytical 
tractability, we assume that εr and εd are independent, as well as Dr and Dd. At this 
stage, we only make a general assumption regarding the shape of the mean sales 




pdyi , { }dri ,∈ .                                                     (4.2) 
which means that yi(p) is a non-increasing function of p.  
The decision process is that manufacturer sets p first, and then retailer decides qr, 
and lastly manufacturer decides qd. Observe retailer and manufacturer’s order 
quantities impact only their own profits but not that of the other channel without 
consideration of demand shift when stock-out occurs. Both of these two channels’ 
capacity decisions could be modeled as independent standard newsvendor problems 
with given p. However, when taking inter-channel excess demand shifting into account, 
manufacturer’s profit would be influenced by retailer’s order quantity, because excess 
demand at retailer may shift to direct channel. Low inventory level at the retailer may 
induce a large amount of demand loss, part of which would switch to direct channel, 
and then increase the demand at the direct channel. Since it is assumed that there is no 
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excess demand shifting to retailer from direct channel, retailer’s profit would still only 
depend on resale price p and order quantity qr.  
Similar as Chapter 3, this decision process is modeled as a Stackelberg game where 
manufacturer plays as a game leader and retailer as a follower. We solve their 
problems backwards, first retailer’s inventory decision with given resell price, and then 
manufacturer’s inventory and price decision.  
4.1.1 Retailer’s problem 
In this section, we investigate retailer’s optimal order quantity with given resale price p 
in both situations that inter-channel excess demand shifting is considered or not. As 
retailer’s profit is only influenced by p and qr no matter whether this shifting is taken 
into account, its order quantity decision would only depend on p in these two scenarios. 
Retailer’s profit function is 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]+−−−−−= rrrrrr DqEvpqcwppq |π ,                           (4.2) 
Let rrrr zpyq σ+= )( , and then zr could be viewed as the safety stock factor in most 
inventory models. As w = kp, πr could be rewritten as  
( ) ( )[ ] ( )pzLpycpkpz rrrrr |)(1| −−−=π ,                                    (4.3) 
where 
( ) ( )[ ] [ ] ( ) [ ]{ }++ −−++−−−= uzEvckpzuEcpkpzL rrrrrr 1| σ .                 (4.4) 
Indeed, ( )pzL r |  is the loss function of uncertainty of demand. With given p, retailer’s 
order quantity problem is a standard newsvendor problem. πr is concave with respect to 
zr, and by solving 0=∂
∂
z
rπ , we obtain 












11*                                                      (4.5) 
and  







−−Φ= −σ .                                     (4.6) 




+=rzF . In this case, the underage cost is 
( ) rcpk −−1 , and the overage cost is rcvkp +− . The following proposition shows how 
the optimal safety stock factor zr* would change with resale price p.  
Proposition 4.1 From equation (4.5) we have  
i) If 
v



































−−= φ . As 0)(
* >rzφ , the sign of dp
dzr
*
depends on that of 
( )vkcr −− 1 . □ 
Remark. As [ ]1,0∈k , if rcv < , zr always increases with p, which means that higher 
resell price would always induce retailer to set a high service level.   
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4.1.2 Manufacturer’s inventory problem 
Manufacturer’s problem consists of determining the optimal order quantity for direct 
channel qd and the resale price p. We start with manufacturer’s order quantity decision.  
As part of the loss demand at the retailer would shift to direct channel, the true 
demand facing direct channel, Rd, includes the “first-choice” customers as well as any 
spill-over customers from the retail channel.  The shifting rate, denoted by λ, describes 
the percentage of unfulfilled retail demand transfer ring to direct channel.  It is 
assumed to be deterministic in this study. Then  
( )+−+= rrdd qDDR λ  ( )+−++= rrdd qDpy λε)(                     
( ) dd Rpy ~+= ,                                             (4.7) 
where 
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.     (4.8) 
In the case that there is no demand loss at the retail channel, dR
~ denotes the random 
part of the “first-choice” demand faced by the direct channel εd. When excess demand 
exists at the retail channel, dR
~  contains εd and the shifting spill-over demand 
( )rrr z σελ − . Let ddd RR σ/~= . The cumulative distribution function of dR :   
 ( ) ( )rdr zptRzptH ,|Pr,| ≤≡  
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σφ )( .                                                                (4.9) 
and probability density function 
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σφφ .                     (4.10) 








Φ−+= )(1)( λσ . Since 
the later addition of E[Rd] is always positive, the expected effective demand at the 
direct channel is positive proportional to the shifting rate and variation of retailer’s 
demand. Moreover, lower retailer safety factor zr would also increase E[Rd]. In the next 
section, we are going to examine the effects of these three parameters. 
The expected profit from the direct channel is  
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]+−−−−−= dddpddd RqEvpqccppq |π ,                 (4.11) 
With given p, the derivative of ( )pqdd |π with respect to qd,  




d ≤−−−−= Pr|π ,               (4.12) 
is a monotone decreasing function and so ( )pqdd |π  is concave with respect to qd for 
given p. The optimal capacity allocation for direct channel qd could be obtained by 
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π  which holds if ( ) ( )( )vp ccpqR pddd − −−=≤Pr . Assuming 
( ) ( ) dddd zpypq σ+=  , we have with equation (4.7) that  
( ) ( )( )vp ccpzR pdddd −−−=≤ σ~Pr ,                                      (4.13) 










1* .                                          (4.14) 
Note that the case of no inter-channel excess demand shifting considered can be 
represented by simply setting λ = 0. Then we have ( ) )(,| tzptH r Φ= , and the optimal 







ccp pd1 . Comparing the equation (4.9) with cumulative 









σ)( that is always less than 1 makes the integrand of ( )rzptH ,|  less 
than ( )uφ . Thus we could expect a higher order quantity when considering inter-
channel excess demand shifting, which is consistent with our intuitive.  
Finally, we solve manufacturer’s pricing problem, to figure out the optimal price in 
the range of ],[ pp to maximize manufacturer’s profit  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ppqpqckpp ddrpm ,** ππ +−= .                              (4.15) 
Here, p  ( p ) denotes the lowest (highest) possible price. The optimal price should not 
only maximize manufacturer’s profit, but also keep retailer’s expected profit positive. 
Joint pricing and inventory decision is, in general, a very difficult task, which is further 
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complicated in our model due to the dependency of the distribution of dR
~  on the 
stocking levels. Since the concavity of ( )pmπ  does not always hold, it is hard to 
efficiently obtain the optimal price. Similar to Petruzzi and Dada (1999), we could find 
the optimal p through a one-dimensional search.  
4.2 Numerical Studies 
As the characteristics of retailer and manufacturer’s optimal behaviors depend 
critically on the type of stochastic demand functions, we in this section try to gain 
some management insights from numerical studies with two specific demand models, 
linear demand model and MNL model. Due to its simplicity, linear demand function 
focusing on the statistical behavior of a large population of customers is the most 
widely used model in researches studying the pricing strategies (Bell et al 2002, Tsay 
and Agrawal 2004, Kumar and Ruan 2006). On the other hand, MNL model, deducted 
from the customer choice model, is prominent on investigating how customer’s 
channel preference impacts the pricing strategy.   
4.2.1 General linear demand function 
We now consider the case where the expected demand functions y(p) are linear in price. 
This linear structure was considered in many papers, such as Bell et al. (2002), Tsay 
and Agrawal (2004), and Kumar and Ruan (2006). Let 
papyr 11)( β−= , 
papyd 22)( β−= , 
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with a1, a2, β1, β2 being positive constants, to ensure that demands are decreasing with 
price.  
To investigate the properties of manufacturer’s profit function under linear demand 
structure, we first study manufacturer’s optimal pricing problem in a special case 
where merchandise cost cr and cd, as well as salvage value of leftover stocks v are 
ignored. From equation (4.5), zr equals to ( )k−Φ− 11  which is independent of p. From 







1* . Then equation (4.15) could be written 
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1122 21 +−−<  
where the last inequality is because cp < p. Let ⎟⎟⎠
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1 . As 
( )ddzh σ
1 >0 and ( )ddzhpk σββ
1122 21 +−− is decreasing with p, )( pmπ is quasi-




k σββ . Thus, we know 
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that the optimal price should be a root of equation (4.17). For general cases with 
merchandising costs and salvage value of leftover inventory, we observed that 
)( pmπ is also quasi-concave with respect to p on ],[ pp  in various numerical examples, 
though we could not prove it theoretically.  
Next we do sensitivity analysis for demand variance at the retail channel σr and 
shifting rate α to explore the effects of inter-channel excess demand shifting on 
manufacturer and retailer’s optimal decisions. In Table 4.1, we assign all the basic 
value of parameters.  
Table 4.1 Parameter setup for linear demand model 
 
Parameter Value  Parameter Value 
a1 50  cp 15 
β1 0.5  cr 12 
σr 8  cd 12 
a2 50  v 8 
β2 0.5  λ 0.5 
σd 8  k 0.4 
 
Here we use exhaustive searching method to locate the optimal price. Regarding 
the distribution of effective demand at the direct channel Rd, we are going to apply 
Monte Carlo simulation method to approximate this distribution, instead of using 
equation (4.9) which is too time consuming to calculate the integral for each t from -3 
to 3 ( σ3±  where σ =1 for standard normal distribution). With a step size of 0.1, for 
each value of price p, we calculate zr and then generate the distribution of Rd which is 
used to find out zd. The sample size of Monte Carlo simulation is 500,000. 
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In the first place, we estimate the effect of retailer’s demand variance on 
manufacturer’s stock level and profit. Higher demand variation induces larger expected 
loss demand at the retailer, which in turn augments the expected demand at the direct 
channel and stock level. Figure 4.1(a) shows how the retail demand variance affects 
the optimal safety factor zd, where the label “S” (“NS”) denotes the situation with 
(without) considering inter-channel demand shifting. Unsurprisingly, zd increases 
obviously from 0.45 to 0.65 as σr rises from 4 to 16. From Figure 4.1(b), we see that 
manufacturer’s profit when taking inter-channel excess demand into consideration, 
compared to ignoring this effect, increases 3% to 15 % without hurting retailer’s profit. 
This increment has two contributors. One is the increase of retailer’s order quantity qr 
according to equation (4.6) with σr as the optimal price stays around 65 when σr  
changes and so does retailer’s optimal safety stock factor zr. The other is that the 










Figure 4.1 Effects of σr on (a) zd  (b) profit 
 
Next, we examine the effects of shifting rate α. Intuitively, substitutability of direct 
channel to traditional retail channel also induces high stocking at the direct channel 
because it results in larger amount of demand loss transmitting. As we can see from 
Figure 4.2(a), zd rises up dramatically from 0.41 to 0.91 as shifting rate increases from 
0.1 to 1. Further, from Figure 4.2(b) we could see that manufacturer’s profit also 
increases from 2% to 13.3% compared to the case without demand shifting being 
considered. At the same time, we find that retailer’s profit scarcely changes, which 
shows that all the increase of manufacturer’s profit comes from the capture of unmet 
demands at the retailer. The unsmooth of the line of zd when considering demand 
shifting is due to the randomness brought about by the approximation of the 
distribution of Rd. 
Indeed, both increases on σr and α would lead to more demands at the retailer 
shifting to direct channel, resulting in the rise of expected demand at the direct channel 
and corresponding manufacturer profit. Furthermore, we observe from our numerical 
experiments that the optimal price is rather insensitive to demand variance and shifting 
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rate. When σr changes from 4 to 16 or α changes from 0.1 to 1, the optimal price stays 
around 65 and the fluctuation keeps within 1. Thus, it is the increasing satisfaction of 
customer demands that accounts for the growth of profit. 
Though we only study the special case a1=a2, β1=β2 here, above results can be 
extended to general cases in which these four parameters can have different values. 
From equation (4.17), the difference between optimal price solving from taking the 
inter channel demand shift into consideration and that from not considering this effect 
depends on λ and σr. Meanwhile, zd also depends on these two parameters but not on aj 










Figure 4.2 Effect of shifting rate on (a) zd (b) profits 
4.2.2 MNL  
In this subsection we use the standard multinomial logit model (MNL), a commonly 
used random utility model in economics and marketing literature (see Anderson et al 
1992), to describe the demand process. In MNL, customer utility uj takes the form of 
iii psu ξ+−= ,  i = r, d, 
where sj is customer’s consumption value for channel i and iξ is an noise term that 
allows for unobservable heterogeneity in taste. The noise term, iξ , follows an extreme 
value distribution with mean of 0 and variance of 
6
2πμ . Let uo denote the utility that 
customer could obtain from outside option. Then similar as the principle of utility 
maximization in the choice model in Chapter 3, customer would choose to purchase 
from the channel providing the highest utility. If uo is the largest of these three, 
customer would not buy this product. The probability of a customer choosing channel i  





















.                   (4.18) 
Assuming the number of customers coming to buy this product follows a Poisson 
distribution with mean of T, the number of customers choosing channel i is assumed to 
be a thinned Poisson process with mean of riT. Using Normal distribution to 
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Though the shifting rate λ can be a given constant just as in general linear model, 
we can calculate it out using the given parameters in MNL, which saves extra 
information for estimation. The customer, who chooses retail channel and would like 
to shift to direct channel when retailer is out of stock, should have od uu ≥ . Then the 
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As both the variation of demand at retail channel and inter-channel excess demand 
shifting rate in the MNL model depend on the value of μ, the monotonicity of 
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inventory level at direct channel does not hold. In the remainder of this subsection, we 
explore the effect of wholesale price k on manufacturer’s optimal behavior. Table 4.2 
shows the basic values of experimental factors considered. 
Table 4.2 Parameter setup for MNL model 
 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
s0 0 cp 15 
sr 85 cr 12 
sd 85 cd 12 
k 0.4 v 8 
µ 15   
As discussed earlier, the contraction parameter k is actually a representative of the 
two companies’ bargaining power. It is also a reflection of double-marginalization 
arousing in vertical competition, which induces high resale price and over-stocking. In 
the case that manufacturer has great bargaining power, it would be set high wholesale 
price to gain large revenue and then aggravate the effect of double marginalization. On 
the other hand, retailer also tends to price very high to cover the wholesale price and 
keep its own margin.  
 
(a) 








Figure 4.3 Effects of bargaining power k on (a) price (b) zd (c) profit 
 
However, as in our model the resale price is controlled by manufacturer, the results 
are much different. We can see from Figure 4.3 (a) that manufacturer tends to set a 
very high retail price to gain enough margins from retailer to cover its production cost 
when retailer has great bargaining power. As k increases, retailer’s margin shrinks 
rapidly, whereas manufacturer’s profit rockets. Large margin also stimulates 
manufacturer to set a high level of safety factor at the direct channel (Figure 4.3 (b)).  
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On the other hand, we find from Figure 4.3 (c) that the effect of capturing 
transmitting excess demand on manufacturer’s profit is not significant even though 
customer valuation varies greatly (when k is 0.7, the profit improvement is only 3%). 
This is probably due to one of the major assumptions lying in the customer choice 
model that all customers are considered to be homogeneous. It would be easy to 






1= , is converging to zero with T. Thus, it leads to very small demand 
variety and then few lost sales at the retailer. Consequently, manufacturer could not 
capture much lost sales from the retailer to improve its profit.   
4.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we study the joint optimal price and inventory decision in a single 
period general dual-channel supply chain model where a monopolist manufacturer 
sells its product to customers through a traditional retailer and also its own direct 
channel. We propose a model to capture the major features of such supply chains and 
use this model to investigate the effect of inter-channel excess demand shifting on 
manufacturer’s pricing and capacity decision. We try to gain some basic idea of 
manufacturer’s behavior from the generated distribution of the effective direct channel 
demand conditioning on retailer’s order quantity and resell price. Following this, we 
obtain the optimal price and capacity decisions.   
Within our model, as the results significantly depend on the stochastic demand 
process, we numerically estimate the impact of inter-channel excess demand shifting 
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based on two general used demand processes, one being the linear demand function, 
the other being the multinomial logit model (MNL).  
In linear demand model, our results show that considering this excess demand 
shifting effect would dramatically increase manufacturer’s capacity reserved for direct 
channel and also the optimal profit, even when demand variance is low and demand 
shift rate is moderate. Yet the optimal price is insensitive to the demand variance and 
demand shift rate. This suggests that it is necessary for manufacturer to take this 
demand shift into account while making capacity decisions when two channels face a 
pool of customers.    
In MNL model, due to the underlying assumption of homogeneous customers, 
demand variance is extremely low as number of customers increases, which results in 
scarce excess demand at the retailer and also low benefit from considering the excess 
demand shift effects. But as manufacturer’s market power increases, retailer’s profit 
margin shrinks and sets low service level, which gives large excess demands and 
stimulates the increase of direct channel demand.  
Thus, whether it is worth to consider this inter-channel excess demand shifting 
when making inventory decision critically depends on the demand variance and 
shifting rate; but it mainly depends on the demand process when setting the resell price.  
Our model also has a few limitations. We only study the decisions made in 
decentralized situation. Comparing our results with the decisions made in centralized 
supply chain, we could know how this kind of demand shifting would affect the 
behavior of over-stocking. In addition, the assumption that Dr and Dd are independent 
is not realistic in many cases and needs to be relaxed. It would be interesting to 
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investigate how the correlation of these two first choice demands would change their 
decisions. Another restriction of this model is that the price is controlled by 
manufacturer. Consequently, retailer does not have much power to react to 
manufacturer’s direct competition with end customers. If retailer could decide its own 
selling price, it could raise the price very high to reach a large margin to compensate 
the low demand, but manufacturer might lose money due to the low demand at retailer.     
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
Motivated by growing attention of both business community and academic society to 
the creation of a manufacturer-owned direct resell channel, the main purpose of this 
thesis is to study how channel members react to simultaneous horizontal and vertical 
competition, and if the resulting conflict might overwhelm any potential advantages. 
This chapter summarizes the research findings and contributions in this thesis, and 
discusses their implications and limitations. Several directions for future research will 
also be presented.  
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5.1 Main Findings 
In this thesis, we mainly focus on the inter-channel competition and coordination in a 
simplified dual-channel distribution prototype. We consider that a monopolist 
manufacturer sells its product through both the traditional retail channel and its own 
direct channel (Figure 1.1). Consumers have different consumption values for 
purchasing from these two channels, and then they make their purchase decisions of 
which channel to purchase from depending on their consumption values and the 
channel selling prices according to utility maximization principle.  
In Chapter 3, we consider the competing pricing strategy in a dual-channel 
distribution system. Consumer’s consumption values, vr and vd, are viewed as two 
independent random variables. The demand functions of these two channels are 
derived based on a linear utility consumer choice model. Both of the optimal pricing 
strategies under centralized decision making and decentralized decision making are 
studied. In the case of centralized decision making, retail price and direct sell price are 
determined in coordination to maximize the total profits of both the two channels. In 
the case of decentralized decision making, manufacturer acts as a pricing Stackelberg 
game leader, who decides the wholesale price (to retailer) and direct sell price to 
optimize his profit first. And then, retailer acts as the game follower, in deciding the 
resale price to optimize his own profit with known wholesale price and direct sale 
price. Retailer’s response for given wholesale price and direct sale price is obtained. 
With retailer’s response function, we provide an algorithm for manufacturer to find its 
optimal pricing strategy. Since the demand functions we consider are quadratic 
functions of pr and pd, the profit functions become cubic functions, leading to 
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significant increases in computational complexity. pr and pd are treated as independent 
arguments, which follows the real characteristic of a competing environment and 
provides higher system-wide profits. Our numerical study shows that manufacturer’s 
profit rises dramatically after launching a new direct channel. On the other hand, 
contrary to many existing studies, retailer’s profit decreases even when consumers 
prefer traditional retail channel to direct sale channel. This result suggests that the 
technique for consumer consumption value modeling plays an important role in the 
pricing decision process.     
In Chapter 4, we study the jointly optimal price and inventory decision as a 
newsvendor problem based on this general dual-channel supply chain model. 
Manufacturer sets identical resell price for both the two channels to avoid inter-
channel price competition. Independent retailer announces its order quantity to 
manufacturer, and then manufacturer decides the production capacity. Special attention 
has been put on the effect of this inter-channel stock-out demand shifting on 
manufacturer’s pricing and capacity decision. We build up the distribution of the 
effective direct channel demand conditioning on retailer’s order quantity and resell 
price. Although retailer’s problem is a standard newsvendor problem, manufacturer’s 
decision is a combined two-stage price-setting newsvendor problem that no closed 
form solution could be obtained. To gain management insights, we numerically study 
this problem based on two demand processes, one being the linear demand function, 
the other being the multinomial logit model (MNL). It is observed that the effect of 
inter-channel stock-out demand shifting on manufacturer’s capacity is quite sensitive 
to the retailer’s demand variance and the rate that spillover demand shifts, while that 
effect on optimal price is not so dramatic.  
Chapter5 Conclusions and Future Work 
78 
 
5.2 Suggestions for Future Work 
5.2.1 Channel coordination under decentralized decision making 
From our study, we can see that inter-channel competition under decentralized 
decision making induces significantly channel conflict and losses of total system 
profits. The problem of channel conflict is also the biggest obstacle of multi-channel 
marketing. The channel conflict between channels can be modeled by the derivative of 
channel profit with respect to the prices at these two channels. A channel coordination 
strategy and supply chain contract under decentralized decision making are worth 
studying to minimize the channel conflicts as well as maximize the channel profits.  
5.2.2 Multi-channel design with multiple products  
Based on the existing works in this thesis, we can further consider the channel design 
problem for a manufacturer producing multiple products. As we have shown, the 
profitability of multi-channel distribution system depends much on the demand 
characteristics of products, and designing the channels that products are distributed 
through should consider both the characteristics of product and that of channel. In 
addition, as differing resell assortments at channels, suggested by various business 
reports, is a useful way to diversify targeted customer segments and alleviate channel 
conflict, it could be studied together with channel coordination, serving as a 
coordination instrument. 
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5.2.3 Equilibrium channel structure with price and service competition 
In most literature on multiple-channel distribution strategy, it is pointed out that 
manufacturer’s direct marketing would raise channel conflict and damage the 
relationship with existing independent retailers. This relationship would be interpreted 
as the sales effort that the retailer would like to spend on this brand to promote its 
demand, like the salesmen’s explanation, or the position where the product is put in the 
store. Beyond using only price as the competing instrument in this thesis, it would be 
interesting to integrate market service level into investigation of, in a scenario with two 
manufacturers and one common retailer, how the direct marketing strategy would 
impact this relationship, how manufacturer’s competitive position would be changed, 
and what the equilibrium channel structure is when competitive manufacturers exist.  
A similar two-stage game model could be employed. Manufacturers need to set the 
optimal resell prices and wholesale prices given the channel structure in stage one. In 
the second stage, given wholesale prices and resell prices, the common retailer decides 
its sales effort to be dedicated to each brand. Three kinds of competition could be 
studied at the same time, manufacturer-level horizontal competition, manufacturer-
retailer vertical competition (double-marginalization), and manufacturer-retailer 
horizontal competition.  
5.2.4 Replenishment policy 
Consider the situation that manufacturer and retailer had replenishment opportunities 
during the selling season. Before the start of the selling season, retailer announces his 
forecast and order quantity to the manufacturer, while manufacturer forecasts the 
Chapter5 Conclusions and Future Work 
80 
 
demand at the direct channel and installs his production capacity. During the season, as 
time goes by, manufacturer and retailer could replenishment inventory based on their 
upgraded demand forecasting for the remaining selling time and on-hand inventory 
level. Manufacturer has to decide whether to replenish, when to replenish and how 
much to replenish (with or without retailer’s replenishment decision).  
Manufacturer’s replenishment lead time might depend on his order size, while the 
replenishment cost depends on the lead time and order size. If retailer foresees a stock-
out and finds that it would be profitable to increase its inventory level, it would place a 
replenishment order to the manufacturer. This replenishment would incur a cost higher 
than the original wholesale price.  
There are two possibilities. One is that manufacturer replenishes its inventory 
before the retailer proposes its 2nd order, and the other is the reverse.  Without the 
information whether retailer would place the 2nd order, manufacturer decide to start his 
2nd production when he anticipates a shortage in direct channel during the remaining 
selling season. If the manufacturer is short sighted, he would only consider the demand 
at the direct channel and ignore the possibility that the retailer might place replenishing 
order. Otherwise, he should take the possibility of retailer’s replenishment into account 
when making decisions.   
When retailer announces his 2nd order, another problem is that whether 
manufacturer should accept this order. If manufacturer accepts this order and decides 
to satisfy it using his on-hand inventory, it could be delivered immediately. 
Manufacturer would also postpone the delivery if he is waiting for his replenishment 
and does not want to satisfy retailer’s order using his now on-hand inventory because 
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this would lead to his out-of-stock situation. However, this delay would impact 
retailer’s order quantity because some demand might already be lost.  Moreover, 
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